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THE NEW YOR STAtE LIQUOR MARKET:
THE kbCKY ROAD TO COMPETITION
Five years ago, New York residents paid between fifty cents and
one and one-half dollars mote than residents of other states for each
bottle of retail liquor.' The "Rockefeller Liquor Law" 2 of 1964, de-
signed to save New Yorkers $150 million annually,3 has not substan-
tially reduced that differential. 4 The New York experience is an exam-
ple of ineffective economic regulation: the state sought low competitive
prices, but was unwilling to remove every obstacle tb that goal;
I
THE VATTERN OF PRIOR LiQijoR REGULATION
New York's Alcoholic Beverage Cbntrol (ABC) Law was designed
to promote both t tfpdiahte in the c6hsumptioi 6f alcoh6lic beveiges
1 Nw YbR MORELAND COMN b& THE ALCbHOLIC iEaGt C6 NROL IAw, REPORT
Nd. 3, MANDATORiY RSALE PIuCE MAri±'aiiRANiE 3 (1964) [hereinaft& ated as M -RELANi
REPoRT No. 3J.
2 Law of April i6, 19A64, ch. 53i, NI.Y. Sesion Laws. ;he iquor refoi legiiaiion ihai
resulted from the M6ieaid studjr was a mbdifed krsi6h of ti Coriifisioii's recoin-
mhdatilons. See pp. 11-16 infra. In a declaiitioh of polhk tie lisiaithtie ltit~d tiiai
the purpos of the law ivas to iminate thle fuiddmentil price discrimmatiol against
the New Yoik cohsiimer.
3 Governor Rockefeller introdicei ahd itrbngij, sup bktecd ttie refor i law igaihst stiff
opposition in the legislatdre. His mieliag to the legislatbre on Martli 25, 1964 proniised
that passage of his ropostis "woild ehd th& $150 millioh tribute noi levied on the
people of the state for the ben'eit df 'a privileged f~w [tie iiqhor iridustr j." N.Y. Times,
Mr. 26, 1964, at 81, col. 7.
4 The most extensive pricd cttiij &ocuired in New York City dutinj the last tWo
mbnthi bi i966. At one bint iambsi hialf the retail sidr~s ii ifat ciiy had redu'ed fhd
prlc of at least brfi6 'of die biiAs they gbld, ift sdnl Eaii by z19 ffiuh is a dl ir per
bottle. Sifi& flint holiddiy seisofi, hdiv6i, sigiiifi~int ri i eaictidlis fli'e been thO
ekceptioh rather than th nile. Ih 6ihii aras bf tlth state, an ilfiosi perfect r~c~rd 6f
malfitairilng the pievious pi-ices is 6daiionai inariid b i impiary p'ic i ivi among a
few retailers. See N.Y. Times, hiiy 4, 1967, , ii 5, col. 3; id., Ddc. 27, 1966, at 55,
col. 2; id., Nov. 30; 1Y66, at 1, col. 1.
In reference to 1966 prices; Donald S. Hostet~i&, Chairman of the SLA, i enfil stated
that "[n]io data is avaiable to indicate ahy addionil price rediki6i at the itlill or
wholesale level." Letter from Donald S. Hiostetter t6 Anth6fty M. Radice, Mai. 21, -1968;
on file at the Cornell Law Library.
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and respect for and obedience to law." Assuming that these goals could
best be achieved by restricting the number of retail outlets, the drafts-
men gave the State Liquor Authority (SLA) the power to issue licenses
to sell alcoholic beverages, to increase and decrease the number of
licenses issued, and to control the location of the licensed premises.6 In
1945, the SLA ruled that "public convenience and advantage are now
adequately served by the number of premises licensed," and declared
a moratorium on the issuance of new package store licenses .7 The SLA
also restricted the relocation of existing licenses (removals).8
In 1950, the legislature amended the ABC Law to require retailers
to sell liquor at or above certain minimum prices.9 The minimum
prices were to be set by the distillers in monthly price schedules filed
with the SLA. Apparently the legislature thought that high, stable,
retail liquor prices would foster temperance.
In 1964, the New York Times reported that certain SLA officials
had accepted money for their approval of applications for new licenses
and for the transfer of existing licenses.' Governor Rockefeller re-
sponded by appointing the Moreland Commission to review the present
5 N.Y. ALCO. 'BEv.' CONTROL LAW § 2 (McKinney 1946). The goals of New York's law
are in general the same as those of other states. See Levin, Economic and Regulatory
Aspects of Liquor Licensing, 112 U. PA. L. REv. 785, 786-88 (1964). The systems and tech-
niques of liquor regulation, however, vary considerably. Eighteen so-called "monopoly"
states purchase and resell "package" liquor themselves. Six states have no state or private
price controls. MORELAND REPORT No. 3, supra note I, apps. A & B; DxSrnuLF SPIRITS INST.,
SUMMARY OF STATE LAWS AND REGULATIONS. RELATED TO DIrIuy. SPIRITS (1966). The re-
maining states use license systems with varying degrees of control over prices and number
and types of retail outlets. The price control systems are: (1) Mandatory resale price main-
tenance (distiller-set, state-enforced consumer prices), (2) Minimum mandatory markups
for wholesalers and retailers, and (3) Private resale price maintenance (fair trade). For a
catalogue of self-imposed regulations of retail outlets among the states, see DIST.LE
SPIRITS INST., id. For the philosophy of liquor control, see generally THE JOINT COMMITTEE
OF THE STATES TO STUDY THE ABC LAws, ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGE CONTROL (1960).
6 N.Y. ,ALco. BEv. CONTROL LAW § 2 (McKinney 1946).
7 The moratorium was promulgated in 1948 by the Rules of the New York State
Liquor Authority, Rule 17 (McKinney 1946), under the statutory authorization given by
the N.Y. ALCo. BEV. CONTROL LAW § 17(2) (McKinney 1946). It was imposed in fear of
liquor price wars due to an excess of retailers. It has also been claimed that the SLA insti-
tuted the moratorium to avoid the nearly impossible job of choosing a few out of many
qualified applicants. Naw YoRK MORELAND COMM'N ON rTm ALCOHOLIc BEVERAGE CONTROL
LAW, REPORT No. 1, TiE LICENSING AND REGULATION OF RETAIL PACKAGE LIQUOR STORES
8-9 (1964) [hereinafter cited as MORELAND REPORT No. ,I].
8 Rules of the N.Y. SLA, Rule 39 (McKinney 1946), (expired 1964).
9 N.Y. ALco. BEv. CONTROL LAw § 101-c (McKinney 1946) (repealed).
10 See, e.g., N.Y. Times, Apr. 19, 1963, at 1, col. 5; id., May 3, 1963, at I, col. 8; id.,
May 24, 1963, at I, col. 6; id., Nov. 5, 1963, at 1, col. 5.
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system of liquor regulations and todetermirie what improvements were
necessary to prevent a repetition'of the SLA scandal."-
The Commission found that SLA controls and "location limits
made a liquor store a profitable business regardless of the size of the
store or the efficiency of its operation. 12 As the profitability of liquor
stores increased, the desirability of retail liquor licenses increased, 3
and, accordingly, the number of qualified applican'ts soon exdeeded the
number of available licenses.14 Because SLA officials had no objective
criteria for choosing between equally qualified applicants, the ftmpta-
tion to accept bribes increased.
Moreover, the Commission found that price control systems had
no discernible effect on individual consumption. 15 Although a substan-
tial reduction in the retail price of liquor would slightly increase total
state sales by increasing sales to nonresidents and to new consumers,16
the Commission concluded that the drinking habits of individual citi-
zens would remain unchanged.' 7 The Commission, therefore, 'recom-
mended that price and location requirements' s and the one-license-per-
11 The Moreland Commission issued the following reports in January 1964 on variousaspects of the liquor control problem: MORLAND REPORT No. 1, ysupra note 7; NEW Yo
MORELAND COMM'N ON THE ALCOHOLIc BEVERAGE CONTROL LAw, R ORT No. 2, THE'Fo6D
REQUIREMENTS IN BARs AND GRuLLs (1964) (not considered herein); MORELAND REPORT No. 3,
supra note 1. During 1963, the commission retained experts in liquor regulation and
economics to prepare five study papers evaluating theeffectiveness of the liquor regulation
systems of various states.
12 MORELAND REPORT No. I, supra note 7. at 9.
13 H. LEVIN, MORELAND STUDY PAPER No. 4, at 16-21 (1963). In the New York City area
the median purchase price for transferred stores rose from $19,490 in 1950 to $39,503 in
1958. In Nassau County, an area of rapid growth during this period, the comparable prices
were $19,000 in 1950 and $54,850 in 1958. Id. at 17. During the period from 1953 to 1962
the increase in sales per store averaged over 100% in some counties. MORELAND REPORT
No. 1, supra note 7, at 10-11.
14 H. LEVIN, supra note 13, at 27-28.
15 S. BACON, MORELAND STUDY PAPER No. 1, at 7 (1963); A. ENTINE, MORELAND STUDY
PAPER No. 2, at 14 (1963).
16 H. WATrE.L, MORELAND STUDY PAPER No. 5, at 59 (1963). Alongwith a slight in-
crease in consumption by the traditional consumers, a price decline will improve sales
principally from these areas: new consumers (including people switching from beer to
other alcoholic beverages), out-of-state residents, New York residents who previously
bought out of state, and price anticipators who withheld normal purchasing in expecta-
tion of the price decline.
17 The controlling factors in explaining different average consumpti6n for different
areas seem to be income level and industrialization of the area. Id. at 40-54. ihe demand
for liquor is inelastic. MORELAND REPORT No. 3, supra note 1, at 35; Dunsford, State
Monopoly and Price Fixing in Retail Liquor Distribution, 1962 Wis. L. REv. 454,481.
18 MORELAND REPORT No. 3, supra note 1, at 30. The repeal of fair trade was explicidtly
not recommended. Id.; MORELAND REPORT No. 1, supra note 7, at 44. Package stores were
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owner rule be abolished. 19 The Commission further recommended that
the SLA lift its inoratorium on new package store iicenses and grant
licenses to all qualified applicants: .
Although Governor Rockefeller strongly endorsed these recom-
mendations, many legislators were reluctant to force small neighbor-
hood liquor retailers to compete in the open niarket.21 The public
demand for lower liquor prices was at least partially offset by the deter-
mined opposition of the powerful liquor retailers lobby.2 2 Mandatory
retail price maintenance and the distance requirements between stores
were repeaedJ to skiisfy the lobby, however, the legislature attempted
to reduce the expected "ruinous retail competition" by prohibiting
retail sales below cost 24 and advertising at a price less than cost by
retailers,25 and by shifting the burden of price reduction from retailers
to wholesaiers nd distillers. This shift was to be accomplished by re-
quiring distiliers and wholesalers to file, with their monthly price
schedules, affirmations that their prices to New York wholesalers and
retailers were not higher than the lowest plices they charged anywhere
else in the country during the preceding month.26 At the same time,
tH6 SLA accepted the bricldiion of the Moreland c6fiiiision and
instituted a phased plan to lift the moratorium on new package store
licenses:27
r6juired to be at leit 700 feet apart (1500 feetl ih New York City). N.Y. ALcO. Biv.
CON T&T'. LAW § l0U(4) (Mckiiney 19465 (repealea). The distiice requirements added to
the restrictions on entry by denying profitable locations to retail stores iiid iestricted
"head-to-head" competition between stores by separating them.
14 MORiEAND REPORiT N. i, supra n6te 7, at 45. N.Y. Aco. BiEv. C6&ONkL LAW § ill
(Mckinfeyr i§4h) ailovs b'loy one liceni to a prs6n and restricts it to th9 licensed premises.
The reg ilatibn prohibits nifiltiple 6ii&ship iid chain si6oes. §ee pp. i25-27 iiira.
26 MORiELAND RPbRRT No. i, i ilpa hot6 7, t 44.
2i The program vias iiitiil defeated by ihe 9ssembly at the id of the 1964 legisli-
tive session. Governor Rockefeller immediately called for a seaci'a session to convene on
April 15, 1964. At that session the legislature enacted a m'o~lfid versioii oi the piogram.
N.Y. Tines, vair. 27, 1964, at 1, il. 8; id., A r. 15, 1964, at 1, cl. 5; id., Apr. is, i964, at
1, col. 8; id., Apr. 17, 1964, at 1, col. 8.
22 Disring ihe ijigiative session, retaileis and thei reprsenti ;s illed ithe galleries.
N.Y. times, Apr. 8, , t 4, it 6, col. 1; 0d., Apr. 1 , i9, it 1, o. 8.
23 N.V. Sesioi Lws &s 798, j 1 ( i99) ~ e 1 .iuprz.
id.
26 Id. § 2; N.Y. ALco. BaV. CONTROL LAw § 10l-b(2)(d) (McKinney Sufp. 1968). Sub-
s~tdii b) forbade sales wivti6ut such iii arffiration and subsctioii (i) made a false
statermefit lih the iffirinatidn a misadriah0r.
27 SLA ililetin 1%b. 396 isnoiiced a four-phase piogram to fadilitaie removils and
new ap Htiatiofis. The fii t tivo pha i provided for removi of xistifng licinses w'ihin
tlfei 6wh couniies, hlui alliirng the 6xistihig i ehsies to benlit fiit fiin ihe voids
te b e tle ioui frez on li'ieg. Th6 oneiny146 ied ibeida 9, Perittwo




INEFFECTIVENESS OF THE LIQUOR REGULATION REFORMS
To date there has been no substantial, widespread reduction in
the retail price of liquor in New York. Three factors are responsible
at least in part, for the ineffectiveness of the liquor regulation reforms:
the structure of the liquor industry, the inherent weakness of the "price
affirmation" as a means of reducing retail prices, and the existence of
private resale price maintenance or "fair trade" laws.
A. Industry Structure
The Moreland Commission assumed that without formal price
controls, competition among retailers would reduce retail liquor prices.
The structure of the liquor industry, however, allows distillers to
maintain high retail prices by means of tacit price controls.
Four distillers dominate the in dustry.28 Their products account
for two thirds of the nation's total retail liquor sales'. Thesq distillers
distribute their products oply through wholesalers with who they
have franchise agreements. Since a wholesaler generally distributes the
products of only one of these major distillers, and since a major por-tion of his business inyolves the frroducts of that distiller. the decisip0
to cancel a wholesaler's franchise may destroy the wholesaler's opera-
tion. A joint legislative committee crated to sudy the AB.G tLw I
clude d that "[D]istillers (by an implied threat of franchise cancella-
tion) are able to dictate and control the policy, bqth as to distribution
and prices of wholesalers."29 In many areas, distillers have set up
subsidiary corporations to wholesale their products, giving them direct
control over wholesale prices. Since the franchised wholesaler for his
area is the retailer's qply potential source of a d istiller' products, con-
trol of a wholesaler's price policy giyes a distiller virtual control over
the price policies of those retailers who trade with it.
The SL. has already acted to reduce the distiller's influence on
the price policies of retailers by ruling that products cannot be with-
stages provided for new license applications. They were to be accepted during four
separate months in 1964 and 1965 and out of each group of qualified applicants 500
would be chosen for license by lottery. The system was thought to be an impartial selec-
tion and orderly expansion of the market. It provoked, however, considerable litigation
by the existing licensres. N.Y. SLA ANNuAL REPORT 9-11 (1964).
28 H. WATrEL, supra note 16, at 4.
29 REPORT OIF THE JOINT LEGISLATIVE COQM. TQ STUDY THE ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGE
CONTROL LAW, 1966 N.Y. Leg. Doc. No. 23, at 7 (1965-60). [hereinafter cited as JoINT
LEGISLATIVE CO M. STUDY].
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held from a retailer without good cause.30 To insulate wholesalers from
distillers' pressure, a legislative committee has proposed that franchise
contracts have a minimum term of three years, that they be cancellable
only for cause, and. that distillers be prohibited from wholesaling
their products.81
B. Ineffectivieness of the "Affirmation" Law I
Because of, difficulties inherent in enforcement and price calcula-
tion, and because of possible schemes for evasion, it is highly question-
able whether the'affirmation law can be enforced and whether, if en-
forced, it will reduce retail prices. 32
It is difficult to determine what is a "price no higher than the
lowest in the country." Price includes 'labor, transportation costs, and
taxes-each factor varies from state to state and each is claimed to be
very high in New York.-3 These variables must be taken into account
in pegging New York's prices to the lowest in the land.84 There are
added problems at the wholesale level. It is naive to expect that a New
York wholesaler* could affirm prices of other wholesalers, with whom
he has had no contact. Nor could he be expected to match every whole-
sale price in other states where operational costs are lower 5 The
affirmation requirement for wholesalers is thu's unworkable and was
repealed before it was ever put into operation.36
Many avenues are open to distillers who wish to avoid the impact
of the affirmationlaw. Low prices elsewhere in the country can be dis-
guised by hidden discounts. For example, a high list price can be set
in a state market to match the New York price while a rebate or kick-
30 Rules of the N.Y. SLA Rule 16, § 65.8 (McKinney Supp. 1967). See also N.Y., Times,
Jan. 27, 1965, at 37, col. 8; id., Feb. 10, 1964, at 84, col. 1; id., Apr. 16, 1965, at 31, col. 8.
81 JOINT LEGISLATIVE COMM. STUDY, supra note 29, at 11. Since prohibiting distillers
from wholesale activity would prevent direct sale to large retailers, which is desirable
as a means of reducing retail prices, this proposal should be modified to prohibit distil-
lers only from having a financial interest in or managerial control of a wholesaler.
32 Newspaper editorials which had strongly supported Governor Rockefeller in the
drive for lower consumer prices were not pleased with the outcome. The affirmation law
was seen as a hollow concession to the movement to lower prices. "It is an unrealistic
statute, extremely difficult to police and vulnerable to abuse." N.Y. Times (editorial), Apr.
21, 1966, at 38, col. 1.
33 See MORELAND REPORT No. s, supra note 1,, at 6-7 & n.8.
84 N.Y. ALCO. 6Ev. CONTROL LAw § 1l0-b3(g) (McKinney Supp. 1968) allows for
.differences'in state taxes and fees, and in the actual cost of delivery." The extent
of delivery costs allowed remains unclear. It would seem, however, that operating costs
are not accounted for.
35 Wholesalers, claim operating costs are' as much as 4% higher in New York State.
See N.Y. Times, Nov. 22, 1966, at 63, col. 2.
36 N.Y. Session Laws ch. 798 (1964).
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back from distiller to wholesaler or retailer hides the actual price.
Prices in other states can actually, be raised to match New York prices
so as not to lose the lucrative New York profits.37 The proof of a brand
can be changed for the New York market, in effect changing the prod-
uct to allow different prices to be charged,38 or the sale of certain
brands can be discontinued in New York.89
Even if distiller and wholesale prices are cut, there is no guarantee
that the consumer will benefit, since price cuts under the old system
were usually absorbed by the lower levels of the distributive chain
rather than passed on the consumer.40
Evaluation of the effectiveness of the affirmation law had to await
a determination of its constitutionality.41 When its validity was sus-
tained and the SLA was finally able to require the affirmed price
lists, no significant price reduction Was in evidence. Although some
37 Before the affirmation law was implemented the expectation was that a sizeable
number of distillers would raise prices in states where they were low so as not to have to'
match those low prices in New York. See N.Y. Times, Apr. 21, 1966, at 32, col. 1; id. at
38, col. 1; id., June 12, 1966, at 37, col. 1. After the SLA required filing of the affirmed
price schedules, there was some evidence of price increase in other states. See N.Y. Times,
May 14, 1967, § 3, at 35, col. 3.
38 The proof or alcohol content is a main factor in' differentiating brands. Tihe SLA'
recognizes the problem and is searching for a solution. See N.Y. Times, Sept. 17, 1966, at
31, col. 8.
39 When the affirmed price lists were submitted, 110 brands were dropped from
sale to avoid reducing N.Y. prices and profits on them. Four of these were among the
nation's 40 largest selling brands. See N.Y. SLA ANNUAL REPORT 7 (1966); N.Y. Times, Sept.
17, 1966, at 31, col. 8.
40 Distiller and wholesaler price cuts and ,discounts have, rarely been passed on to
the consumer; the expectation under the new law was not optimistic in this respect. See
JOINT LGIsLATIVE COMM. STUDY, supra note 29, at 8. In 1967 an amendment was passed
that required wholesalers to pass on to the retailer the proportionate amount of any
price reduction received from the distiller. N.Y. ALco. BEv. CONTROL LAW § 101-b(3)(b)
(McKinney Supp. 1968). This provision as well is difficult to enforce, and does not prevent
the retailer from absorbing the reduction. Retail stores still claim that price reductions do
not reach them. N.Y. Times, June 9, 1967, at 65, col. 2.
41 In Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc. v. Hostetter, 16 N.Y.2d 47, 209 N.E.2d 701, 262
N.Y.S.2d 75 (1965), aff'd, 384 U.S. 85 (1966), the New York Court of Appeals and the
United States Supreme Court sustained the constitutionality of the affirmation law. The
Court of Appeals found it a valid and reasonable regulation under the police powers and
the Supreme Court affirmed, pointing out the 21st amendment gives the states complete
power over liquor regulation within their borders. It is interesting to note that the
justification of police power over liquor is to foster temperance, i.e., to discourage its
consumption, while the purpose of the affirmation is to lower consumer prices. The
solution, of course, is that the police power is broadly defined, that concepts of public
welfare change, and that the power to abolish liquor traffic (given to the states by the
21st amendment) logically includes the power to set any standards for its conduct, even
unreasonable ones.
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bi-fid prics Wei reduced, a far greater iimber rtmained the samine
or increased, and a number of brands Were dropped.42
Although the industry cdtild claim that these unihipessive results
indicate that distiller and wholSalei- prices were Pot excessively high
ift the first place, it is by no means certain that the prices rest on a com"
petitive level. In fact, one stud showed New York wholesale Ptites
higher than another market's retdil prices. 43
C. Private Resale Pric Maihidiiance-Fai- Tadi
Observers found the Moreland Commission's recommendation to
retain private, resale price maintenance inconsistent with the repeal of
state, mandatory price maintenance a4 After i964, private fair trade
contracts, permitted by the Feld-drawford Act, 45 were used by the dis-
tillers to set retail prices at their previous levels. By means of an in-
junction against sale below fair traded prices, the contracts are enforce-
able against both conracdting retailers and noi-sigii[6riL Thug, 6ie
price can be maintained in a geographic area regardless of how many
retailers actually agree to the set prices. Since evidence before the Com-
misgidtn showed that Piies ire g~nrally high in tateg that allv fair
tid ,4 6 retefntiofn 6f faii tirde idefiied to be elf-defeitifii gb th iefoi'in
legislation: In a market in which taste and brand loyalty are strong
elerihnts of demand, and in ali industry which is concehtrated oii the
manufacturer's leve 47 and has a history of vertical price fixing, fair
tiade can be a very e4ective techiique f6r price maintenanc. 4  The
42 Affirned Price iits iiere fil~d 6n SEpt. 12, i966. dut 6k i, 41 braids, pri'ces
decreased on 549 from 1 cent to $20.30 per case (12 bottles), 701 brand IriEks remained
c6fistant; 91 lirdfid prices inacised fr6in I cefit ib $4J.18 per case; and 110 braids Were
di6pped. Eveh thE largest ifigle price ijitiaiibn ifi the Pi6puiir 6ate~dries bf liqu8i
wdre fi6t ipfiapisi4 i- Sc&chi;-$5.00 er Eas&, R-ye straight-$5.99 pei 6ase, Btfiidbm-2.66 per
ca.e; Gin-S2.02 per Eas6, D6ur-bon bbnd-$4.31 pei 6ase:
4 M6RELAib Raiobm- No. 3; supra fnotd i, ctdit 8, at 6:
44 It Was p6irit~d ou't that "In v6 ing t6 abdlish the old trice-rixing iystemfi, inast
legisltbrs fiildd to hotitE that Mr. Rock~felle had pointed out a way the distillers could
really continue it." The Governor iiad Ienntioned faii titde as A inethod Of Preventifig
price -*is, Bhit thE disfitleri iisdd fair trade ai a complete substitute fbr th& bld law. 1.Y.
Tiliiei, Feb. 6; 1966, § 4; at 6, col. 1. See alsb id;, AiPr. 21, 1966; ii 38, col. 1.
45 N.Y. G.. BiJs: Lkw § 369 (McKI hney 1968).
46 See MORiLAND REPbRT NO. 3, ,uprh fibte 7, app. D, at 40:41.
47 See pp. 117-18 supka.
48 The two lrincipal chirabteristics of a irice-rfiiintaifted mdrket die distinctively
branded products and a degree of effecti ;e moriopoly power on the maiufactut6t' level.
Liqtibr is the most ideal exainple of a market suited for fair tradd, for there ". .. is
brand differentiation, extensive adVettising; strong dbiler &gdhizatioi; ind often, ih
additioin, very rstrictive licefnirig atrafigemehis for dealets." Bdivmen, Rwsale PricE
Mdintentante-mA Monopbly Problem 25 J. BUS; U. 0hf. 141, 143 t .te . (1952), rkprintd
in 1 L. SCHwARTz, FRE ENTERPRISE AND ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION 518, 521 (3d El. 1966).
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Commission, by not recommending the abolition of fair trade, left the
door open for distiller enforcement of fair trade contracts in 1964 that
prevented the reduction of prices.49
Fair trade enforcement initially proved to be almost as effective in
maintaining prices as direct state enforcement, 0 since the New York
courts enforced the contacts despite the attempted price reform.51
Since 1964, however, the effectiveness of fair trade has declined. Open
retail price cutting did not begin until late in 1966, but when price cut-
ting occurred, it indicated that fair trade contracts were not maintain-
ing the price level. When the SLA finaly put the affirmation law into
operation in the fall of 1966, the distiller price reductions were hardly
impressive.P2 But the trickle of retail price cutting that had begun in
19j6 developed noticeably during the Qhristmas season of 1966. It
hardly fulfilled expectations, hpiyever, since jt was limited to fewtYer
than half the stores of New York City, and the price cuts themselves
were not always s ubstantial.0 Nevertheless, their significance lies in
the fact that they were not distiller price reductions caused by the
affirmation law, but were reductions of retail margins in spite of fair
trade contracts.
The effe ctiyeness of fair trade conracts d clined for two reasons.
1i JOINT LEGISLATIVE COMM. STUDY, supra note 29. It was concluded two years after
the price "reform" legislation was enacted that:
All distillers have now entered into contracts with retailers mandating price-
fixing. Since the advent of the 1964 liquor laws, distillers brought more than 200
legal proceedings to enjoin package stores from cutting price. The New York
consurmer, therefore, has received little, if any, benefi; frqm pFassage of the law.
Id. at 8.
50 The exception to this was R.H. Macy & Co. of New York City which attempted
to openly reduce all its retail liquor prices immediately after mandatory price main-
tenance was repealed. Their determination brought on fair trade suits from all the
major distillers and has kept them in court ever since. E.g., Victor Frichel & Co. v. R.H.
Macy & Co., 20 N.Y.2d 180, 229 N.E.2d 26, 282 N.Y.S.2d "84 (1967); National Distillers &
Chem. Corp. v. R.H. Macy &: Co., 23 App. Div. 2d 51, 258 N.Y.S.2d 298 (1st Dep't 1965).
51 E.g., National Distillers & Chem. Corp. v. Seyopp Corp., 17 N.Y.2d 12, 214 N.E.2d
861, 267 N.Y.S.2d 193 (1966); National Distillers & Chem. Coip. v. R. H. Macy & Co., 28
App. Div. 2d 51, 258 N.Y.S.2d 298 (1st Dep't 1965).
52 See note 42 supra.
53 In New York City open price cutting had been attempted by Macy's and a few other
large retailers in 1964-65; at the same time a small percentage of stores were giving
price reductions flunder the table." By the spring of 1966, 15% of New York City's stores
were cutting prices to a limited extent, somewhat less than the $1.00 to $1.50 promise of
1964. By December about half the stores in that city had joined the competition but this
was the farthest the development reached. The New York Times kept a close watch on
developments in the liquor industry in those years, particularly prices. See N.Y. Times,
Jan. 27, 1965, at 37, col. 8; id., Apr. 16, 1965, at 31, col. 8; id., Aug. 28, 1965, at 22, col. 1;
id., Apr. 1, 1966, at 37, col. 4; id., Nov. 80, 1966, at 1, col. 1; hi., Dec. 27, 1966, at 55,
col. 2; id., May 14, 1967, § 8, at 35, col. 3.
1968]
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
First, the maintenance of fair trade prices requires consistent enforce-
ment against all price cutters.5 4 This is an expensive burden on any
distiller even if the price cutting in the, market is relatively minor.
Second, a fair trade contract maintains retail prices which only indi-
rectly affect distiller profits. Faced with a choice between maintaining
vigilant, expensive ,fair trade. enforcement systems, or allowing a small
number of price-cutters to continue, possibly increasing the volume of
distiller sales, a large number of distillers chose not to enforce fair
trade.55
There was little price, cutting after the 1966 New York City
activity. A legislative committee thought that a general price reduction
could be achieved only, by the complete exemption of alcoholic bever-
ages from fair trade legislation." The Court of Appeals, however, acted
first, and in Victor Fischel & Co. v. R.H. Macy& Co., 57 it seriously dis-
couraged the effective use of fair trade contracts in the liquor industry.
Based more on, legislative policy than statutory language, the decision
found fair trade injunctions inconsistent in practice with the purpose
of the 1964 reform:
If this objective [prices pegged to the lowest in the nation]
can be frustrated by Feld-Crawford injunctions, such as the one
now under review, then the whole legislative process of eliminat-
ing the "exclusive price-fixing power in the hands of the distillers"
... has been full of sound and fury, signifying nothing.58
The court's solution was not to construe the 1964 law as repealing the
fair trade'law but, rather, to attempt, to apply the latter consistently
with the former.
54 See General Elec. Co. y. R.H. Macy & Co., 199 Misc. 87, 103 N.Y.S.2d 440 (Sup. Ct.),
rev'd on other grounds, 278 App. Div. 939, 105 N.Y.S.2d 1003 (Ist Dep't 1951); Calvert
Distillers Corp. y. Nussbaum Liquor Store, Inc., 166 Misc. 342, 2 N.Y.S.2d 320 (Sup. Ct.
1938). The reasons compelling a manufacturer -to use fair trade are pressure from con-
servative retail outlets and avoidance of price wars during which the manufacturer usually
is forced to cut his own prices. See I L. SC HWARTZ, FRE ENTERPRISE AND ECONOMIC ORGA-
NIZATION 515-22 (3d ed. 1966). It is common in the liquor industry for retailers to
take a distiller's product "off the shelf" (discourage its sale) to bring pressure on the
distillers to enforce fair trade against price cutters. See, e.g., N.Y. Times, Feb. 4, 1966, at
33, col. 8.
55 By 1967 Seagrams was the last major distiller still attempting to enforce compre-
hensively its fair trade prices. Between 1964 and 1967 Seagrams instituted over 275 actions
to maintain its prices. N.Y. Times, June 9, 1967, at 65, col. 2. The primary reason for
the other distillers' abandoning fair trade enforcement was simply that expense exceeded
benefit derived. See N.Y. Times, May 14, 1967, § 3, at 35, col. 3.
56 JOINT LEGISLATIVE' COMM. STUDY, supra note 29, at 11.
57 20 N.Y.2d 180, 229 N.E.2d 26, 282 N.Y.S.2d 234 (1967).
58 Id. at 185, 229 N.E.2d at 28, 282 N.Y.S.2d at 237.
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Prices to be fixed by liquor injunctions under the Feld-Crawford
Act cannot be set at higher figures than those which would result
in the normal course of business from the application of the price
reduction provisions of that legislation. The burden of showing
whatever is necessary to be established rests upon the plaintiff in
an action for a Feld-Crawford injunction.59
This decision reduces the effectiveness of fair trade in maintaining the
previous high price level. Before a distiller can obtain court enforce-
ment of his fair trade contract, he must show that he has complied with
the 1964 affirmation law and that the retail prices which he is setting
are commensurate with the manufacturer and wholesaler prices on the
affirmed price list. In other words, a court will demand proof that price
reductions at the top are carried down to the consumer.
Fischel, however, does not guarantee major price cuts. It deprives
the industry of some of the benefit of and thus some of the incentive
for formal distiller price-fixing, and in this way could discourage the
use of fair trade contracts to externally support retail prices. The case
is significant in that it adds another difficulty to the distiller's advan-
tageous use of fair trade and, together with the factors previously men-
tioned, might lead to the complete elimination of fair trade contracts
in the liquor industry.
The eventual abandonment of fair trade contracts due to diffi-
culties of enforcement might have been anticipated by the Moreland
Commission's failure to recommend their discontinuance.6 0 Its mem-
bers may have expected fair trade to be no more effective in maintain-
ing liquor prices than in the general merchandising area where dis-
count houses ignore the fair trade price. They could not have foreseen,
however, the holding of the Fischel case.
The state of the market today shows that fair trade contracts are
ineffective in the face of even a relatively small amount of price cut-
ting; thus it would seem that retail prices should fall to a competitive
level. This assumes, however, that retail profit margins are large
59 Id. at 189, 229 N.E.2d at 31, 282 N.Y.S.2d at 241 (emphasis added). National Dis-
tillers & Chem. Corp. v. Seyopp Corp., 17 N.Y.2d 12, 214 N.E.2d 361, 267 N.Y.S.2d 193(1966), and other cases in which fair trade injunctions were granted regardless of the 1964
reform, were distinguished on the grounds that these injunctions were granted before the
affirmation law became operative-before its constitutionality was sustained, supra note 41,
and thus while that law was stayed by the courts. 20 N.Y.2d at 185, 229 N.E.2d at 29,
282 N.Y.S.2d at 238.
60 One study paper predicted that even if all distillers immediately employed fair
trade to support prices, the obstacles to competitive prices would be temporary. "Distiller
policing of prices under the Feld-Crawford Act is likely to be sporadic and ineffective
as compared with State policing in a market as large as New York State." H. WALraL,
supra note 16, at 56.
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enough to absorb substantial, permanent price reduction while main-
taining a reasonable return to the retailer. The structure of the retail
market toay does not support this assumption.
III
OBSTACLES TO THE REDUCTION OF RETAIL LIQUOR PICES
Spokesmen at all levels of the industry claim that New York retail
liquor prices cannot be further reduced. They claim low profit margins
for most New York retailers and wholesalers and place the blame on
New York's high operating costs.6 ' The Moreland Commission demon-
strated, however, that the difference between operating costs in New
York and operating costs in other states does not justify a difference in
retail liquor prices of $1 to $1.5Q per bottle.62 Despite high prices, high
total costs yield small profit margins for New York retailers and whole-
salers. A substantial portion of those costs are directly attributable to
the inefficiency of their operation.
The Moreland Commission noted that the price and entry restric-
tions of the ABC Law encouraged operational inefficiency among whole-
salers and retailers. 6 With profits guaranteed and with a neighb.orhood
monopoly practically assured, there was little incentive to use resources
more efficiently or to introduce more modern methods of distribution
and sale. What competition did develop was nonprice competition-
services and various forms of advertising such as gifts and tokens.6 4
In 1964, after the legislature had acted upon the Commission's
recommendations, entry to the retail liquor market was unrestricted,
but fair trade contracts maintained high' prices. Since prices remained
high, more retailers were induced to enter the market than would have
entered had prices been set by market competition. 5 Accordingly, with
the same sales volume spread over more stores, each store's gross sales
decreased causing a decrease of gross profit on sales. Furthermore,
wholesalers' costs increased because the same volume of merchandise
had to be distributed to more outlets.6 6 These increased costs, when
passed on to the retailer, further reduced the retail prqfit margin.
61 see, e.g., N.Y.'Tiin6s, Nv'."22, 1966, at 63, "oL' 2; id.,Aig 28," 165, at 22- co1. 1.
62 MORELAND REPORT No. 3, supra note 1, at 3-7.
63 See p. 115 & note 12 supra.
94 It is a very conmqn piactice in the liquor industry for the distillers and whple-
saesto distribute free gifts, ppet~es t.to retailers (b oqh oli- anfi pff:prePisps
consunpon outlets) and-consumers for advertising and goq win purppses. Many of the
gifts, e.g., gaudy advertising clocks, are rather expensive but quite useless.




Both these causes of inefficiency tan be elitiifiatd withih th
existing reguldtbir ffameWvrk by the oierafibfi bf 6&iipetiti& f6deg
within the mhaik6t. Ev~h withOut legislative chdifige, Pfite coriipetition
will develop as the effectivehs§ ot fdii tfide t6fitfht dihihihes. S66A
outlets will bd forced otit of the m aiket. those r~ifairiifi will be stin-
ulated to mbdernize theii operationls.
A third cause of int fficiniy can only be reiedied by ignificant
ltgislatidh. Its elimihatiofi, how&Ver, dffefs tht greatest pbtdntial iewdird
in cost and thus price savings. This inefficiency restilti pfincipally ftr6fi
twO regulations that severely limit th& tye 6f ietii okitlei: ihe one-
license-per-6w&ier ahid the lihf-6fll rtiles.
Despite the Morelahd C6oniissi6n'. fifidifig "that ttiipethnce is
not affected either by the numbef or the itpe of liquor outlets,167 the
ABC Law forbids the issuaince of mor6 than one license to an indi-
vidual6 1 and restricts that license to the specific premises licensed.69 The
effect of this rule is to deny the liquor c6figuier the conoinies of scale
and operational 'efficiency attehdant td fh ffiodein ciaili-store method
of retailing. The brigihal jhstificatiofi of thd i-ule haig proved to be
fallacious, but the ruld stifviVes despite th economic *dste it creates.
The ABC Laiv Piovifion thit "N6 lichgee . . . 9hall b6 engaged
in ahy othet busihegs 6ii the lithkd preniisK" 76 has been interpreted
by the SLA to hale a dual meahiig. By epliitly pi6hibiting sales of
other prddutts on the premises, it prevents supentiiarkes and depart-
ment stords from having liquor departmpiitn. Mo6 gignificantdy, the
SLA has extebded the piohibitioh to ekcluLid6 Afydne iii a geieral
merchandising busiiess f-romi having a liciige.7 This pliicy, along with
the one-license-per-oWner rule, has serVed only to prot&t the market
from low-cost competitors. The abolitibfl 6f both Policies would open
the market to chain liquor stores fid wbfild alloW liqiior gales in de-
partment stores and guprmarkets.
Two consideratidns point to this aviiiie foi kefierali peimaient,
and substantial price reduction. The Ditrict 6f Cluiibia peraiits
liquor sales in drug and groTery stbres, and laige 6ltiihe i taileis have
67 MORiLAiND RiPORT No. 1, supri nate 7, at 31.
b8 N.Y. ALCO. Bi. CONTROL LkW g 63(5) (M~ihniej 1946).
69 Id., § 63(A), ill.
70 Id., 63 4).
71 See MORELXNI REPORT NO. 1, stfirh hoe 7, at 87. Bef6re ihis poicy was adopted a
few early licensees, such as Macy's, Gimbfi's att Blo6imihgdales in New York City, were
able to enter the retail licji6 ni fket d igite thei general merchandising business. They
were and still are, however, subject to the "segregated premises" rule, N.Y. ALcO. BEV.
CONTROL LAW § 105(2) (McKinney Supp. 1968), which requires that the liquor sales be
conducted exclusively on a premises for that purpose ivith iii ubiii efitrance to the street
(not to another part of the building).
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developed. It was formerly assumed that Washington's lack of price
maintenance explained the $1.50 per bottle difference between the
District of Columbia and New York prices. But now that New York
has no effective price maintenance and her prices still exceed Washing-
ton's, it is clear that restrictions on the kind of retail outlet are sig-
nificant7 2 And it is no coincidence that the New York retailers leading
in the attempt to reduce prices are Macy's and Gimbel's department
stores, 73 even though their liquor premises must be segregated from
the rest of the store.7 4
The repeal of these rules would force the small retailer to stream-
line his business or abandon it. It is argued that the small neighbor-
hood store with its personalized service performs a useful and beneficial
role in our society. The answer to this is that since the consumer pays
the price he should decide which is more beneficial to him-lower
prices or personalized service. Why should he be forced to take the lat-
ter? It is also claimed that the small retailer's investment should be
protected since he relied on the law. As was said against the retention
of the moratorium,75 however, the liquor traffic is at the discretion of
the state, and licensees are aware when they open their business that its
regulation, and in fact its continued existence, can be changed at any
time. Furthermore, the retailer's dilemma is merely the age-old business
decision of whether to revamp his operation to compete directly with
the modern retail outlets, to remain unchanged in hope of retaining
most of his customers with his "personalized ' neighborhood-type store,
or to abandon the business altogether. A similar dilemma faced small
grocers as supermarkets developed, and many have survived. Because
of the possible hardships, however, a plan liberalizing the licensing
scheme in stages would be appropriate.
Another fear is that the proposal would present problems of en-
forcement and administrative supervision for the SLA, stemming from
the many types of new licenses. No specific difficulty beyond those
existing in the present system, however, has been raised. Testimony has
indicated that chain stores and supermarkets would be no more diffi-
72 The District of Columbia, Missouri, Nebraska, and Texas all have very low retail
prices compared to New York. See MORELAND REPORT No. 3, supra note 1, app. D, at 40-41.
The prices of these states were used by the Moreland Commission to show that low prices
result when there are no price controls. The Commission failed to point out, however,
that in these four areas liquor sales are not restricted to liquor stores. In these four areas
and in many other states, liquor sales are permitted in drug and grocery stores, and more
than one license per owner is allowed. See generally DxsTrsr.r Spurrs INst., supra note 5.
73 See note 53 supra.
74 See note 71 supra.
75 See Levin, supra note 5, at 823.
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cult to control than present retail outlets, 76 and other states with such
a distribution system seem to have no greater enforcement problems
than New York.
Two other legislative restrictions hinder competitive market
forces. The 1964 reform, rather than stimulating retail competition as
it proposed, attempted to erect additional barriers to that goal by for-
bidding retail price advertising77 and sales below cost.78
The ban on price advertising by retailers serves no genuine pur-
pose. If competitive forces develop, the ban cannot stop them; it can
only inconvenience them. The SLA has no sympathy for the rule, and
consequently advertising gimmicks have grown up to circumvent it,
i.e., advertising low prices without mentioning the figures.79 A statute
that serves no purpose and is violated with impunity hardly fosters
"respect for the law." And the only purpose it can serve-stifling com-
petition-is obnoxious to the announced goal of competitive prices.
The proscription of retail sales below cost, though also enacted to
stifle competition, may nonetheless serve a useful purpose. "Loss-
leader" competition, and particularly its relative, "predatory pricing,"
might be considered undesirable in that they give an unfair competitive
advantage to larger stores. Although the consumer may benefit when
the large retailer, with his cost advantages, competes with the small
neighborhood store, the consumer's interest is not served if the former
employs an effective predatory pricing policy designed to establish a
monopolistic position. Furthermore, preventing sales below cost does
not hinder price competition.
76 Data on liquor law violations in the various states are scaice and, because of other
factors contributing to liquor law violations, comparisons between the number of viola-
tions and the liquor control system used are not very useful. One conclusion from these
comparisons, however, has been made: ". . . [W]here a rigorous form of control is used,
one indirect problem of alcohol, violation of code provisions, is considerably higher than
in those places where a less rigorous form of control is used." S. BACON, supra note 15,
at 52.
77 See p. 116 supra. Another explanation for the enactment of the advertising
ban has been proposed: "It was generally understood that the legislators-resentful of the
pressure put on them by the Governor, whose liquor law reforms had the editorial support
of most newspapers-wrote in the advertising ban to retaliate against the newspapers."
N.Y. Times, Apr. 1, 1966, at 37, col. 4.
78 MORELAND REPORT No. 3, supra note 1, chart 8, at 6. This chart shows the relation-
ship between wholesale cost to New York retailers and consumer prices in the District of
Columbia, Miami, Chicago, and New York City.
79 More blatant ruses have been used, such as advertising "$1.00 off regular price."
These have been considered legal by the SLA, thus there is little enforcement of the
advertising ban. See JOINT LEGISLATIvE COMM. STy, supra note 29, at 9; NEW YoRK
SLA ANNUAL REPORT 8-9 (1966).
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CONCLUSION
The announced goal of the 1964 legislation was competitive prices,
but its reforms have been ineffective. The thrust of the legislation was
price reduction above the retail level, although market conditions con-
sistently pointed to the retail level as the place for the largest price
reductions. The post-1964 experience has shown that even if the More-
land Commission's entire reform program had been enacted, the goal
of free market prices would not have been achieved. Repeal of manda-
tory price maintenance did not yield low prices, and even private
resale price maintenance has been substantially abandoned without
widespread effect on prices. Repeal of the fair trade law in so much
as it applies to the liquor industry may not be politically feasible, there
being no justifiable distinction between the liquor market and other
branded product markets. By reforming the structure of the market
to allow it to approach and in fact combine with the supermarket-
grocery store market, however, the high price effects of fair trade would
disappear. Since prices cannot be consistently upheld, the incentive for
fair trade will disappear and its use and enforcement will deteriorate.
Reform is needed to change the retail market structure and to
regulate informal vertical control. To permit liquor sales in a wide
range of retail outlets, the liquor-only and one-license-per-owner rules
should be repealed. To soften the disrupting effect of new types of
retail outlets on the old, the rules should be lifted in accordance with
a phased plan designed to eliminate slowly inefficient operation. To
insure price competition, retailers should be allowed to advertise price
and thus the advertising ban should be repealed.
To regulate directly distiller control, a minimum time of three
years should be set on franchise agreements, and distiller financial and
managerial interest in wholesalers should be forbidden. The repeal
of the fair trade law for the liquor market is not vitally necessary, but
its repeal would accelerate the move towards competitive prices. Finally,
since the affirmation law has proved a failure, the SLA should be re-
lieved of its useless administration.
Anthony M. Radice
